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R
ice is the staple food of about 80 percent of
Filipinos and is a major item in the consump-
tion basket of consumers. It is the single most
important agricultural crop in the Philippines and
a major source of income for millions of Filipino farmers.
In 1995, the Philippines, along with Japan and South
Korea, was granted exemption from the removal of the
quantitative restriction (QR) on rice under Annex 5 of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement. The QR puts
a limit to the volume of rice imports that may enter the
country and is meant to protect the local rice sector from
the inflow of various imported rice varieties. The exemp-
tion on the removal of QRs on rice in the Philippines is
supposed to expire on December 31, 2004. If the re-
moval of the exemption is lifted by then and unrestricted
rice imports will be allowed to enter the country, what
will the effects be on the local rice industry? How about
on the poverty situation in the Philippines? On income
distribution? And on prices?
This Policy Notes presents a summary of the key simula-
tion results done by this author on an analysis of the
consequences of this forthcoming expiration.
Rice policy
Because of the political significance of rice, the govern-
ment is heavily involved both in its supply and distribu-
tion aspects to assure consumers of a sufficient and
stable supply of rice at low prices and to maintain a rea-
sonable return to rice farmers through adequate price
incentives. The present pricing policy of the government
involves the setting and defense of a price floor and ceil-
ing. The policy also seeks to minimize seasonal price
variations in the various regions. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment monopolizes the importation and exportation of
rice through its various procurement and disbursement
operations in order to influence domestic price levels.
Currently, government interventions are implemented
through the National Food Authority (NFA), an attached
agency of the Department of Agriculture (DA).
Data would indicate, though, that on the procurement
side, NFA’s intervention has declined through time, from
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Procurement Production Injection Supply
(a) (b) (a)/(b), % (c) (d) (c)/(d), %
1975 233                     6,381                 3.7 227                 4,262            5.3
1980 551                     7,646                 7.2 280                 4,945            5.7
1985 401                     8,806                 4.6 365                 5,693            6.4
1990 572                     9,319                 6.1 667                 6,095            10.9
1991 555                     9,673                 5.7 158                 6,196            2.6
1992 420                     9,129                 4.6 521                 4,965            10.5
1993 155                     9,434                 1.6 489                 5,357            9.1
1994 61                       10,538               0.6 112                 6,284            1.8
1995 8                         10,541               0.1 257                 7,182            3.6
1996 124                     11,284               1.1 733                 7,975            9.2
1997 101                     11,269               0.9 623                 7,625            8.2
Source: Rice Statistics Handbook, PhilRice - Bureau of Agricultural Statistics,
Department of Agriculture
Palay (' 000 mt) Rice (' 000 mt)
Table 1. National Food Authority’s palay procurement and rice injection
7.2 percent of total production in 1980 to 0.6 percent in
1994 and to 0.1 percent in 1995 (Table 1). It slightly
recovered to 1.1 percent in 1996 but declined again to
0.9 percent in 1997. This is largely due to NFA’s budget-
ary problems.1 On the other hand, NFA’s rice injection
into the system is relatively significant. In 1996, NFA’s
injection of rice into the market was 9.2 percent of the
overall supply. It slightly dropped to 8.2 percent in 1997.
Figure 1, meanwhile, compares the retail price of ordi-
nary rice and the world price of rice for the 35 percent
broken type. These two types are comparable in terms of
quality. The gap in the prices has widened from 20 per-
cent in 1989 to 130 percent in 2001. A major factor for
this growing gap is the import control on rice through the QR.
Food and poverty
Recent statistics indicate that about half of the rural
households in the Philippines live below poverty line while
one-fifth of the urban households fall below the poverty
threshold (Table 2). For the rural poor households, more
than 60 percent of their expenditure go to food, half of
which are spent on cereals consisting of rice and corn
(rice has a much larger share). An almost similar struc-
ture is observed in the expenditure pattern of the urban
poor households.
In addition, grains production utilizes most of the agricul-
tural resources. In particular, about 5 million hectares of
arable land are devoted to rice and corn production, two-
thirds of which are under palay. Majority of the rural popu-
lation—about 1.8 million people—likewise
depend on the grains sector. This implies
that if the government fails to intervene
because of budgetary and other adminis-
trative problems, causing farm palay prices
to fall below the support price, the impact
on farm incomes could be substantial.
Sectoral results
Now what would happen if the present
policy of QR on rice will terminate as pro-
vided in the WTO article?
Table 3 shows the results of this author’s
simulation (SIM_1) involving total elimina-
tion of QR. The results indicate that the
import price of ‘rice and corn milling’ in
local currency (δ pmi) drops significantly by
–54.4 percent (Table 3). This translates
to a surge in rice imports (dmi) by 1,567
percent.2 On the other hand, the consumer
________________
1 To date, NFA is saddled with huge financial
losses.
2 Although the increase is large, the share of
rice imports remains relatively small compared to
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prices (δ pci) for irrigated palay, nonirrigated palay, and
‘rice and corn milling’ decline by –2.7 percent, –1.9 per-
cent, and –2.2 percent, respectively. Domestic demand
(δ di) in these sectors also decline.
As expected, the general equilibrium impact of this policy
change is negative on agriculture, particularly irrigated
and nonirrigated palay in terms of price and volume ef-
fects. The output price (δ pxi) of irrigated palay, nonirrigated
palay and ‘rice and corn milling’ drops by –2.7 percent,
–2 percent, and –2.2 percent, respectively, while the vol-
ume of output (δ xi) declines by –0.9 percent, –0.7 per-
cent, and –1 percent, respectively.
Alternately, of course, these results can  also be reversed
to argue that the distortive effects of the QR on rice im-
ports attract resources into palay production and away
from other agricultural crops. This move-
ment of resources creates inefficiency in
resource allocation within the agriculture
sector as well as in the rest of the economy.
One result that ought to be highlighted is
the overall decline in consumer prices (δ pci)
by –0.3 percent. This should be favorable
to all consumers in two ways: it increases
real consumption and it reduces the nomi-
nal value of the poverty threshold as dis-
cussed earlier.
The effects on the factors of production
are critical in completing the analysis of
the impact on poverty and distribution.
Because of the drop in output and price of
palay and rice, the demand for factors and
the factor prices drop as well. For example,
the return to capital used in palay produc-
tion and in ‘rice and corn milling’ drops sig-
nificantly relative to the other sectors (Table
4). The demand for labor also drops in
those sectors. All wages drop, except for
wages of unskilled production workers. Put
together, the effects on value added are
unfavorable to the palay rice sector in general.
Poverty and distributional effects
In terms of the distributional implications, the simulation
study divided the household sector into 12 socioeconomic
groups (Table 5). There are six urban household groups
and six rural household groups, with each category bro-
ken down according to the type of occupation and level
of education of the head of the family.
Table 6 presents some of the characteristics of the house-
hold groups. Among urban household groups, urb1 has
the lowest per capita income, followed by urb4. While
both groups have a low level of education, the former is
employed while the latter is self-employed. Households
in the informal urban sector and unemployed are included
in the latter. The highest poverty indicators (head-count,
Table 2. Food and poverty
Poverty Incidence  1997  50.7%  1997  21.6% 
2000  48.8%  2000  18.6% 
Consumption  1997  2000  1997  2000  1997  2000  1997  2000 
Food Consumption*  63.6%  63.6%  47.6%  47.6%  61.4%  60.8%  38.8%  38.7% 
Cereals*  29.5%  28.8%  15.4%  14.6%  24.5%  23.0%  8.6%  8.2% 
*Percent of Total 
Source: 1997 and 2000 Family Income and Expenditure 
Poor  Nonpoor  Poor  Nonpoor 
Urban  Rural 
Table 3. Effects on prices and volume (SIM_1)
Sectors δpmi δpci δpdi δpli δpxi δmi δdi δqi  δei δxi
Irrigated Palay 0.00 -2.69 -2.69 -2.72 -2.72 -10.6 -0.93 -0.93 0.00 -0.93
Non_Irrigated Palay -1.94 -1.94 -1.96 -1.96 0.00 -0.74 -0.74 0.00 -0.74
Corn 0.00 -1.07 -1.08 -1.09 -1.09 -4.28 -0.29 -0.51 0.09 -0.29
Sugarcane -0.68 -0.68 -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.07
Livestock 0.00 -0.49 -0.49 -0.50 -0.50 -0.59 0.11 0.10 0.41 0.14
Other Agriculture 0.00 -0.58 -0.68 -0.70 -0.60 -0.63 0.08 0.07 1.06 0.19
AGRICULTURE 0.00 -0.82 -0.86 -0.87 -0.82 -1.15 -0.06 -0.08 0.72 0.00
Food Processing 0.00 -0.19 -0.29 -0.20 -0.20 -0.21 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.09
Rice & Corn Milling /a/ -54.40 -2.78 -2.23 -2.15 -2.15 1,567        -0.98 1.02 0.00 -0.98
Sugar Milling 0.00 -0.29 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -1.04 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.22
Fertilizer 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.10 -0.05 -0.08 0.00 -0.01
Other manufacturing 0.00 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.09
Other industry 0.00 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 -0.10 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.05
INDUSTRY -0.17 -0.31 -0.35 -0.33 -0.26 0.26 -0.09 0.07 0.00 -0.02
Transportation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Other Services 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07 -0.05 0.05
Government Services 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06
SERVICES 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.03
TOTAL -0.16 -0.26 -0.28 -0.27 -0.21 0.22 -0.03 0.05 0.03 0.00
where xi    :  total output pxi    :  output prices
mi : imports qi     : composite commodity pqi     : composite commodity prices
ei  : exports pdi   : domestic prices pmi  : import (local) prices
di  : domestic sales pli  : local prices
Price Changes (%) Volume Changes (%)May 2004 4
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gap, and severity)3 among urban house-
holds are found in these two groups.
The effects on income, weighted consumer
prices, poverty and distribution across
household groups are summarized in Table
7. Largely because of the drop in factor
prices, overall household income declines
as QR is removed. Because this drop is
mainly caused by the surge in rice imports,
this may be considered as the displacement
effect. The largest drop is observed in house-
holds in rur1 (–0.9 percent), followed by rur4
and ur1 (–0.6 percent).
These households are highly
dependent on factor in-
comes derived from agricul-
ture. Furthermore, these
household groups have the
lowest per capita income.
Thus, the impact worsens
the income inequality prob-
lem as indicated by the in-
crease of 0.16 percent in the
Gini coefficient.
The drop in consumer prices
faced by the various household groups miti-
gated the negative effects on income as
indicated by the overall drop in the
headcount index of –0.02 percent. How-
________________
3 The headcount index is the common index
of poverty, which measures the proportion of the
population whose income (or consumption) falls
below the poverty threshold. The poverty gap, how-
ever, measures the depth of poverty in the sense that
it indicates how far below on average the poor are
from the poverty threshold. The poverty severity
index is sensitive to the distribution among the poor
as more weight is given to the poorest below the
poverty threshold. This is because this index corre-
sponds to the squared average distance of income
of the poor from the poverty line.
urb1 worked for private household and private establishment; zero education up to third year high school
urb2 worked for private household and private establishment; high school graduate and up 
urb3 worked for government/government corporation
urb4 self-employed without employee; zero education up to third year high school; including unemployed during 1994 survey.
urb5 self-employed without employee; high school graduate and up; including unemployed during 1994 survey.
urb6 employed in own family-operated farm or business; worked with pay in own family-operated farm or business; 
             and worked without pay in own family-operated farm or business
rur1 worked for private household and private establishment; zero education up to third year high school
rur2 worked for private household and private establishment; high school graduate and up 
rur3 worked for government/government corporation
rur4 self-employed without employee; zero education up to third year high school; including unemployed during 1994 survey.
rur5 self-employed without employee; high school graduate and up; including unemployed during 1994 survey.
rur6 employed in own family-operated farm or business; worked with pay in own family-operated farm or business; 
             and worked without pay in own family-operated farm or business
































Table 5. Definition of household groups
Per capita Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty
Households Income (p) Line (p) Headcount,% Gap,% Severity,%
Philippines 15,730                    8,897                   40.7 13.7 6.2
urb1 13,000                    9,688                   41.7 12.9 5.6
urb2 26,954                    10,181                 15.5 3.7 1.3
urb3 26,468                    9,665                   10.2 2.5 0.9
urb4 14,472                    9,584                   42.3 14.9 6.9
urb5 27,980                    10,138                 16.9 4.8 2.1
urb6 35,650                    9,647                   18.2 6.0 2.8
rur1 8,247                      7,827                   58.7 19.7 8.8
rur2 13,723                    8,177                   31.3 9.7 4.3
rur3 18,123                    8,106                   22.4 6.8 2.9
rur4 8,559                      7,984                   61.0 21.9 10.3
rur5 13,756                    8,259                   37.5 12.0 5.0
rur6 13,641                    7,607                   39.9 12.0 5.2
Source: 1994 Family Income and Expenditure Survey
Table 6. Household income, poverty line and poverty indices (1994
prices)
Table 4. Effects on factors, in percent (SIM_1)
Return to
Capital (%)
Sectors δpvai δvai δri L1* L2* L3* L4*
Irrigated Palay -3.29 -0.93 -4.40 -2.76 -2.76 -3.29 -3.16
Non_Irrigated Palay -2.34 -0.74 -3.19 -1.82 -1.82 -2.35 -2.22
Corn -1.28 -0.29 -1.57 -0.54 -0.54 -1.08 -0.95
Sugarcane -0.89 0.07 -0.79 0.13 0.13 -0.41 -0.28
Livestock -0.60 0.14 -0.40 0.41 0.41 -0.14 0.00
Other Agriculture -0.70 0.19 -0.40 0.41 0.41 -0.14 -0.01
AGRICULTURE -1.02 -0.01 -0.94 0.00 0.00 -0.26 -0.11
Food Processing 0.10 0.09 0.20 0.23 0.31
Rice and Corn Milling -3.01 -0.98 -3.85 -4.22 -4.15
Sugar Milling 0.20 0.22 0.40 0.41 0.55
Fertilizer -0.10 -0.01 -0.10 -0.08 0.03
Other manufacturing 0.10 0.09 0.20 0.16 0.27
Other industry -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 -0.16 -0.08
INDUSTRY -0.20 -0.03 -0.30 -0.11 -0.04
Transportation 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.07
Other Services 0.10 0.05 0.20 0.15 0.21
Government Services 0.10 -0.06 -0.06
SERVICES 0.09 0.03 0.19 0.06 0.13
TOTAL -0.22 0.00 -0.18 0.00 0.00
-0.99 -0.99 0.10 -0.20
where pvai  :  value added prices      ri  : return to capital
vai  :  value added *L1, L2, L3, & L4: Labor type 1, 2, 3, & 4
Value Added
Changes (%) Labor Demand (%)
Average wage -->No. 2004-04 5
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ever, the drop in consumer prices is not significant enough
to counter the negative income effects in critical house-
holds with a very high incidence of poverty or the poorest
of the poor. For example, the headcount index for rur1
increases by 0.25 percent, for rur4 by 0.15 percent, and
for urb1 by 0.11 percent. The worsening of poverty in
these groups can also be observed from the larger in-
creases in the poverty gap and severity indices. As these
indices give more distributional weight to the poorest
below the poverty threshold, this means that the aver-
age income of the poor in those household groups has
deteriorated further away from the poverty threshold. This
also means that the degree of their being poor has in-
creased as the QR on rice is eliminated.
On the whole, while the overall poverty headcount drops,
the elimination of the QR on rice imports can be described
as generally not pro-poor. It worsens the income inequal-
ity problem. The drop in consumer prices is not signifi-
cant enough to mitigate the negative effect on income,
especially in household groups where the problem of
poverty is severe.
Possible safety net
The four experiments summarized in this section show
the effects of implementing policy measures that can
offset the negative poverty effects on households ad-
versely affected, particularly urb1, rur1, and rur4 (Table
8).
SIM_2 involves a 50 percent reduction in the direct in-
come tax rate of the three household groups that is fi-
nanced by a compensatory indirect output tax. It shows
a favorable effect on the overall poverty situation as the
three poverty indices indicate negative changes. How-
ever, the effects on rur1 households are small. This is
because this group has very small direct tax rate; thus, a
50 percent reduction in the rate would not make much
difference.
SIM_3 involves a 10 percent increase in government
transfers to the three groups that is financed by a com-
pensatory indirect output tax. The overall improvement
in poverty is better here than in the previous case as
indicated by a larger reduction in all poverty indices. The
largest improvement is observed in rur1 because being
the poorest group, it has a larger amount of government
transfer. Thus, a 10 percent increase would have greater
benefit to this group than to the other two. There is also
an improvement in the distribution as indicated by a re-
duction in the Gini coefficient.
Table 7. Effects on household income, consumer
prices, and poverty, in percent (SIM_1)
Disposable Consumer
Income Prices /a/ Headcount Gap Severity
Philippines -0.23 -0.34 -0.015 0.103 0.146
urb1 -0.56 -0.39 0.108 0.379 0.444
urb2 -0.01 -0.27 -0.478 -0.807 -0.893
urb3 0.06 -0.24 0.000 -0.915 -0.976
urb4 -0.25 -0.33 -0.144 -0.155 -0.188
urb5 0.02 -0.25 -0.827 -0.684 -0.774
urb6 -0.11 -0.19 0.000 -0.166 -0.216
rur1 -0.90 -0.51 0.247 0.785 0.984
rur2 -0.25 -0.40 -0.980 -0.339 -0.376
rur3 -0.01 -0.34 -1.357 -0.751 -0.908
rur4 -0.58 -0.48 0.146 0.173 0.224
rur5 -0.13 -0.39 -0.245 -0.569 -0.719
rur6 -0.37 -0.42 0.000 -0.125 -0.135
Change in
Gini Coefficient 0.162
/a/ sectoral consumer prices weighted by household consumption weights
Poverty
Table 8. Poverty effects under various scenarios
(% from base)
Change in Gini
Headcount Gap Severity Coefficient
Philippines -0.339 -0.571 -0.729 -0.056
Urb1 -1.818 -2.313 -2.699
Rur1 0.000 -0.086 -0.113
Rur4 -0.575 -0.953 -1.209
Philippines -1.150 -1.150 -1.474 -0.234
Urb1 -1.624 -1.624 -1.882
Rur1 -3.385 -3.385 -4.206
Rur4 -1.605 -1.605 -2.038
Philippines -0.384 -0.615 -0.810 -0.143
Urb1 -0.465 -0.758 -0.888
Rur1 -0.883 -1.089 -1.357
Rur4 -0.570 -0.830 -1.053
Philippines -0.219 -0.352 -0.454 -0.011
Urb1 0.000 -0.325 -0.373
Rur1 -0.680 -0.674 -0.848































SIM_4 involves a 50 percent fertilizer price subsidy by
the government that is financed by a progressive com-
pensatory direct income tax. This experiment also brings
about a favorable poverty effect as the three indices show
reduction for the three groups. Income distribution also
improves. However, the improvement in poverty and dis-
tribution is lower compared to SIM_3.
SIM_5 also involves a 50 percent fertilizer price subsidy
by the government. However, the subsidy is financed by
a compensatory indirect output tax that creates another
round of distortionary effects. The results indicate that
while the overall poverty as well as the poverty for the
three groups improves, the effect is lower compared to
SIM_4. This is because the increase in the indirect tax
creates an additional wedge between the domestic price
and local price4 in all commodities. Thus, it reduces the
full price effects of the removal of the QR and the fertil-
izer price subsidy. This additional price wedge is not cre-
ated in SIM_4.
Thus, the results of the experiments indicate that the
policy that would lead to higher poverty-offsetting effects
for the three poorest household groups that are adversely
affected by the market reforms in rice is an increase in
the direct government transfers to these groups (SIM_3).
Conclusion and policy recommendation
QR on rice will be phased out by the end of 2004. While
this policy reform may be justified for efficiency purposes,
the displacement effects of the expected surge in rice
imports will translate into larger negative income effects
for household groups where the problem of poverty is
severe. This is because these groups rely heavily on ag-
riculture, particularly palay rice production, which is ex-
pected to contract when QR is removed.
As a result, factor demand and factor prices in agricul-
ture drop. Factor incomes derived from agricultural pro-
duction decline as well. While all household groups enjoy
reduced prices of rice as QR is removed, the drop in con-
sumer prices is not significant enough to mitigate the
decline in income for those groups that are adversely
affected. Thus, all poverty indicators for these groups
show higher values, which means a worsening of their
poverty situation. Furthermore, the overall Gini coeffi-
cient increases, which indicates worsening of income in-
equality.
The policy lesson that may be drawn from the exercise is
that while market reform is generally necessary, it has to
be carried out carefully, especially if implemented in a
critical commodity such as rice. Although market reforms
in rice can potentially have favorable effects on consumer
prices in general, some household groups may be ad-
versely affected by the expected surge in rice imports.
Policy measures may have to be designed to counter these
effects.
Among the various poverty-offsetting measures experi-
mented in the paper, the results indicate that an increase
in direct government transfers to these adversely affected
household groups can provide a better safety net. How-
ever, this is more of a short-run policy measure and not
a substitute for policy measures that have favorable longer
term implications. Among these measures with longer
term effects are productivity improvement through a vig-
orous program of intensified use of high-yielding rice va-
rieties, irrigation, better farm-to-market roads, and mea-
sures to encourage the growth of other nonrice crops.      
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4 Local price is without local taxes and can be considered as cost
of production. Domestic price is with local taxes and can be consid-
ered as sales price.